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Despite ever-growing interest in the “social
brain” and the search for the neural
underpinnings of social cognition, we are
yet to fully understand the basic neu-
rocognitive mechanisms underlying com-
plex social behaviors. One such candidate
mechanism is the control of neural rep-
resentations of the self and of other peo-
ple (Brass et al., 2009; Spengler et al.,
2009a), and it is likely that “common”
disorders of social cognition such as
autism and schizophrenia involve atypi-
cal modulation of self and other repre-
sentations (Cook and Bird, 2012; Ferri
et al., 2012). This opinion piece will first
consider self-other control as a possible
low-level neurocognitive mechanism for
social functioning across many domains of
social cognition. Neuroscientific evidence
will be drawn upon and the potential
for a better understanding and iden-
tification of neuropsychological markers
for atypical social cognitive development,
discussed.
A CANDIDATE MECHANISM
Humans are uniquely social beings and
therefore identifying commonalities in
the mechanisms recruited across various
domains of social cognition is important,
providing an understanding not only of
typical social cognitive function but also
what happens when this goes wrong. A
candidate process which may be recruited
across a range of socio-cognitive tasks is
the ability to hold in mind and man-
age neural representations of both the self
and of other people. Motor representa-
tions pertaining to the self and of the
other are necessary in the case of imitation
(di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al.,
1996), and self and other representations
of mental and affective states are necessary
for theory of mind and empathy, respec-
tively (Decety and Grèzes, 2006; Brass and
Spengler, 2008; Iacoboni, 2009). Within
each of these domains of social cognition
a form of “contagion” can be observed
where information is shared between rep-
resentations of the self and other. In the
case of action observation, individuals
automatically and often non-consciously
imitate the actions of those with whom
they interact (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999;
Brass et al., 2000; Heyes, 2011).
Social interaction therefore appears to
be facilitated by a shared representa-
tional system. However, social situations
sometimes require an individual to dis-
tance themselves from other people and
in other instances require one to engage
more with representations of others. For
example, when taking another’s perspec-
tive, engaging a successful theory of mind,
or empathizing with others it is impor-
tant to put aside or inhibit one’s own
perspective, mental or affective state and
enhance that of the interacting other.
Conversely, in order to control the ten-
dency to imitate others’ actions and gen-
erate our own independent actions, we
must inhibit the motor representation per-
taining to the interacting other and acti-
vate the motor representation for our own
intended action. Differing requirements to
inhibit or enhance representation of the
self or the other for successful social inter-
action highlights the crucial role played
by the ability to control or switch between
neural representations attributed to the
self and to other people, hereafter referred
to as “self-other control” (Decety and
Sommerville, 2003; Brass and Heyes, 2005;
Spengler et al., 2009a).
A task now readily used as a behavioral
index of self-other control is that of the
control of imitation (Figure 1; Brass et al.,
2001, 2005, 2009; Spengler et al., 2009a;
Catmur and Heyes, 2011; Santiesteban
et al., 2012a,b; Sowden and Catmur, 2013).
The task requires participants to inhibit
imitative response tendencies, and there-
fore provides an index of an individual’s
ability to enhance the self-representation
whilst inhibiting the other-representation.
Additionally, Obhi and Hogeveen (2013)
have proposed a complimentary task
whereby performance under the oppo-
site control requirements can be inves-
tigated; inhibiting the self-representation
whilst exciting the other-representation. In
combination, these tasks provide a neat
index of control, the ability to supress not
only representations of the other but also
of the self.
Despite the very different higher-level
cognitive processes involved in a wide
range of social cognitive abilities, a series
of behavioral findings in neurotypical
adults support the existence of a common
low-level mechanism of self-other con-
trol. Performance in one social domain
such as the control of imitation corre-
lates highly with performance in other
social domains requiring self-other con-
trol. These include perspective-taking, the-
ory of mind and empathy (Spengler et al.,
2010a), and remain even when control-
ling for more general executive function-
ing processes (e.g., Spengler et al., 2010b).
The link between performance on differ-
ent tasks requiring self-other control is not
merely correlational; training to inhibit
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FIGURE 1 | Example of stimuli presented and participant responses
required in a task to measure the control of imitation. The task:
Participants are instructed to make either an index or middle finger lifting
action in response to a colored cue (orange or purple square) presented on the
monitor display. The cue is also accompanied by a task-irrelevant hand
performing an index or middle finger lifting action. Thus, task-irrelevant stimuli
can be either imitatively compatible or incompatible with the required finger
response. An index of self-other control is calculated by subtracting response
times on compatible trials from those on incompatible trials. Imitative
compatibility of the task-irrelevant stimuli with the required finger lift response
is also indicated for trials in which an orange square indicates lift index and a
purple square indicates lift purple.
imitation produces an enhancement of
perspective-taking abilities (Santiesteban
et al., 2012b). Moreover, priming pro-
social attitudes enhances automatic imi-
tation but not a non-imitative control
process (Leighton et al., 2010; Cook and
Bird, 2011) and engaging in more social
interaction appears to improve other social
abilities (Hogeveen and Obhi, 2012). Both
of these examples support the enhance-
ment of a common process involved in
social functioning.
A NEURAL BASIS FOR SELF-OTHER
CONTROL
As well as the medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC), the right temporoparietal junc-
tion (rTPJ), a brain region located at
the intersection of the superior tempo-
ral sulcus and inferior parietal lobule,
has attracted extensive research atten-
tion and has now been implicated in a
wide range of social cognitive abilities,
including judging agency, perspective-
taking, theory of mind and empathy
(Decety and Sommerville, 2003; Decety
and Lamm, 2007; van Overwalle, 2009;
Sperduti et al., 2011). A series of stud-
ies by Brass et al. (2001, 2005, 2009)
and Spengler et al. (2009a,b) utilized
functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) to localize the neural areas
related to the control of imitation to
the rTPJ and mPFC. These studies sug-
gest that the mPFC and/or the TPJ may
be the neural substrate of self-other
control.
Further, causal evidence for the role
of the rTPJ in self-other control is
derived from studies measuring the effects
of magnetic or electric stimulation of
this area. Disruptive repetitive transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) of
rTPJ has been shown to impair perfor-
mance in both the control of imitation
(Sowden and Catmur, 2013) and the-
ory of mind (Costa et al., 2008; Young
et al., 2010). Excitatory transcranial direct
current stimulation (tDCS) enhanced imi-
tative control and perspective-taking per-
formance (Santiesteban et al., 2012a). The
work of Santiesteban and colleagues is
particularly noteworthy, as excitation of
rTPJ enhanced self representations and
inhibited representation of the other in
the imitation inhibition task, but also
enhanced other representations and inhib-
ited self representations in the perspective-
taking task. This pattern of results is
best explained by the up-regulation of a
mechanism which facilitates the control of
self and other representations. Similarly,
acquired temporoparietal lesions have
been associated with rare disorders such
as asomatognosia, characterized by the
misidentification of part of one’s own body
as belonging to another (Feinberg et al.,
2010) and anosognosia, characterized by a
denial or unawareness of a paralyzed limb
(Ramachandran and Blakeslee, 1998).
Another competing idea is that the
mPFC and rTPJ, rather than facilitat-
ing the control of competing representa-
tions of self and other, may in fact help
to differentiate task-relevant from task-
irrelevant representations (Nicolle et al.,
2012; Cook, 2014). Indeed, there may be
an interesting avenue for picking apart
these two dimensions. However, at present
it remains unclear how this mechanism
may extend to a range of social cogni-
tive abilities investigated to date in the
self-other control literature, and how this
may translate into a mechanism capable of
explaining atypical social cognition.
ATYPICAL SOCIAL COGNITIVE
DEVELOPMENT
Uncovering a common low-level mech-
anism for social cognition seems
particularly useful when considering
atypical social cognitive development.
Mirror touch synaesthesia, in which the
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observation of touch or pain to others
elicits an overt somatic sensation in the
synaesthete’s own body, is also associated
with structural abnormalities in the TPJ
and could be described as one example of
a disorder of self-other control (Banissy
and Ward, 2013; Holle et al., 2013).
Similarly, the ability to control neu-
ral representations of the self and of
other people seems a central aspect of
more common disorders of social cogni-
tion, such as autism and schizophrenia
(Spengler et al., 2010b; Ferri et al.,
2012). Several studies postulate atypi-
cal self-control in these disorders which
impacts upon the attribution of agency
to self and others in individuals with
schizophrenia (Renes et al., 2013), and
impairments in inhibiting imitation, the-
ory ofmind and perspective-taking in ASD
(Lombardo et al., 2010, 2011; Spengler
et al., 2010a,b). Lombardo et al. (2011)
identified abnormalities in the recruit-
ment of the rTPJ when making judgments
requiring self-other differentiation in
individuals with ASD relative to con-
trols. Similarly, Spengler et al. (2010b)
found that, in a sample of high func-
tioning autistic individuals, increased
imitation was associated with reduced
theory of mind and decreased activity
in areas typically required for self-other
control. Despite varied terminology,
including self-other “differentiation,” “dis-
tinction,” “switching” or “agency,” all
postulated processes appear to share a
common feature of the “control” of shared
representations.
Indeed, key aspects of the schizophre-
nia symptom profile can be explained by
a deficit in self-other control. Identity and
reality disturbances including hallucina-
tions and delusions of persecutory con-
trol, disturbed consciousness and thought
insertion exemplify a misattribution of
self-generated, internal representations to
others or the external world, highlight-
ing a difficulty in managing represen-
tations of self and others (Frith, 1992;
Allen et al., 2004, 2006; Jeannerod, 2009).
Moreover, abnormal structure and func-
tion of the TPJ is reported in individuals at
risk (Brüne et al., 2011), as well as suffering
from schizophrenia (Benedetti et al., 2009;
Lee et al., 2011; Das et al., 2012; de Achával
et al., 2012; Koeda et al., 2013), relative
to healthy controls. Diminished activation
of this region has been associated with
impaired social cognitive performance, in
particular theory of mind and emotion
processing domains (Benedetti et al., 2009;
Lee et al., 2011; Das et al., 2012).
More recently it has been suggested
that the impairments seen in ASD and
schizophrenia can be characterized as a
failure of top-down modulation of social
behavior (Southgate and Hamilton, 2008;
Cook and Bird, 2012; Cook et al., 2012;
Wang and Hamilton, 2012). Of particular
note, Cook and Bird (2012) found that the
modulatory effects of priming pro-social
attitudes on self-other control observed
in neurotypical adults were absent in
individuals with ASD. In the same vein,
reduced fronto-temporal functional con-
nectivity is now a well-established feature
of schizophrenia and has been linked to
diminished top-down modulatory control
over social behavior (Allen et al., 2008;
Cook et al., 2012).
A NEUROCOGNITIVE MARKER FOR
ATYPICAL SOCIAL COGNITION?
Although we know little about the precise
developmental trajectories for the neu-
rocognitive deficits discussed, by high-
lighting a mechanism with the potential
to explain many facets of social cogni-
tive function researchers may be better
equipped to advise on neurocognitive
markers and possible interventions for
common disorders of social cognition.
Self-other control emerges as such a can-
didate neurocognitive mechanism. Future
assessment of disorders of social cogni-
tion can benefit from the now widely used
task of imitative control (Figure 1) as a
robust behavioral index of self-other con-
trol which includes the requirement for
online modulation of both self- and other-
representations in one task. Performance
on imitative control tasks predicts perfor-
mance across various domains of social
cognition, and thus may provide a means
to predict a pattern of atypical social devel-
opment, in addition to measures of the
structure and function of critical regions
such as the rTPJ and mPFC. One may
predict that individuals with autism or
schizophrenia will be impaired at control-
ling imitative response tendencies, indica-
tive of a deficit in self-other control.
This opinion piece has explored
behavioral and neuroscientific evidence
for self-other control as a candidate
neurocognitive mechanism for social
cognition. With advances in the field, a
mechanism such as this may be crucial
in identifying neurocognitive markers of
atypical development and providing a
therapeutic target to ameliorate the symp-
toms of atypical social development. Of
particular promise from the application
of such a mechanism is a unified account
of the broad range of social functioning
impairments associated with ASD and
schizophrenia.
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